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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WALTER W. KERSHAW 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
vs. 
TRACY COLLINS BANK & TRUST 
Administrator of the 
Estate of HALLIE LOVE 
DENNIS, also known as 
MRS. CHARLES F. DENNIS 
Defendant-Respondent 
Case No. 14512 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent believes that the court must have before 
it a full exposition of the facts, which are best stated 
and documented directly from Appellant's deposition (R.41). 
Appellant Walter Kershaw is a retired executive of 
Wheeler-Kershaw, a Caterpillar distributorship (Kershaw 
deposition, page 4). He owns and manages income-producing 
properties in several states (D.3), and he is a world 
traveler (D.39,40). | 
Hallie Dennis was the widow of Earl Dennis, who died 
in January, \^72 (D.5). Kershaw described himself as 
Earlfs closed "friend, his "buddy," long-time brother Mason 
and Shriner, and active fellow Presbyterian (D.6,48,49). 
By Earl's will, Tracy-Collins Bank acted as trustee 
for Hallie and paid to her or for her benefit whatever nec-
essary for her support and maintenance (D.25,35). Halliefs 
personal estate consisted of her home, a $20,000 certificate 
of deposit and some valuable jewelry (D.26). Hallie main-
tained her own checking account and paid her personal 
expenses from that account (D.25). 
When he was in town, during the three years following 
Earl's death, by his own statement Kershaw took over the 
supervision of Hallie's personal life (D.7). He chauffered 
her, bought groceries, ran errands (D.15), did menial repair 
work at her home (D.24), hired and fired nurses (D.ll) and 
doctors (D.45), hired and directed her attorney (D.. 6,28), 
occasionally reviewed her personal check book (D.33), vetoed 
payments from her personal funds which she wanted to make 
(D.ll), and would not allow Hallie to consider a gift to the 
church of her choice (D.8,44,45). 
Kershaw took over supervision of Hallie's life because 
he felt that he had been "charged" by his Masonic brother, 
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Earl, to Mlook after11 Earlfs widow (D.13). Kershaw de-
scribed Hallie as follows: 
She was the most demanding, cantankerous bitch 
that God ever created, and she knew that her 
husband, Earl Dennis, had charged me with the 
responsibility of taking care of her before her 
death. And she went out of her way to make it 
miserable with her demands. (D.12) 
When asked if he considered his services rendered 
i 
to Hallie as work or a job, he countered: 
What do you mean I looked on it, thought it was 
a job? It was a demand, a request to perform 
services for her. And she made it so unbearable 
that you couldn't do anything but perform the 
services. (D.47) 
Kershaw admitted that there was never any agreement, 
written or oral, for any payment for any of his services or 
mileage (D.20,21,23). There was no writing which could be 
considered as an acknowledgment of prior services (D.22). 
Kershaw never asked for or demanded of Hallie during 
her lifetime any compensation for any services or mileage 
(D.24). In his personal income tax returns for 1972, 1973 
and 1974 he did not claim as a business deduction his ex-
penses for mileage regarding the errands and chauffering 
for Hallie (D.47,48). Hallie never offered to pay Kershaw 
for anything other than reimbursement for groceries and 
medical supplies purchased by him (D.23). She accepted the 
fact that Earl had "charged" his brother Mason to "look 
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after" his widow (D.12). Kershaw did not expect any pay 
or gratitude from Hallie during her lifetime. When asked 
if Hallie ever agreed to pay for his auto expenses, he 
replied: 
No, she didn't. She wasn't that type of a 
woman. She wasn!t generous, letf s put it 
that way. She was most demanding. (D.23) 
Hallie died on February 7, 1975. Kershaw filed a 
claim for $6,600 with Tracy-Collins Bank, Halliefs executor. 
The claim was rejected; and Kershaw sued, claiming for ser-
vices rendered for and on behalf of Hallie over the three-
year period from Earl's death. His claim was for 2,345 
hours time at $2.00 per hour and 20,925 miles traveled at 
12^ per mile. The claim alleges services rendered "covering 
the preservation of the estates as well as all personal care, 
maintenance and supervision of all of the deceased's affairs 
and operations." (R.4) The claim gave credit for $2,000 
for receipt by Kershaw of a diamond ring by Hallie's will 
and codicil, leaving a net claim of $4,600 (R.4). 
Hallie's will dated January 27, 1972 (R.30) gave to 
Kershaw an option to buy the diamond ring for $2,000. 
Hallie instructed Kershaw and Ralph Miller, the attorney 
brought in to Hallie by Kershaw (D.6), to make the codicil 
dated May 2, 1974 (R.38) and thereby bequeath the ring to 
Kershaw (D.17,18). Kershaw admitted that Hallie had bequeathed 
-4-
to him the ring as compensation for services (D.19,20). 
Kershaw's deposition (R.41) was taken by Respondent. 
Based on the facts as shown in the deposition, Respondent 
moved the District Court for Summary Judgment, which Judge 
James S. Sawaya granted, stating in his memorandum deci-
sion (R.44): 
I am of the opinion that the better reasoned 
rule of recovery under the facts established 
in this matter, is the rule urged by and sup-
ported by the authorities stated in defendant's 
memoranda. I don't believe, giving plaintiff 
the benefit of the facts stated in his deposi-
tion, that he is entitled to recover under any 
theory of express or implied contract. 
ARGUMENT 
Appellant's brief limits his claim to quantum meruit, 
for giving to Hallie Dennis personal care, for preserving 
her estate and for supervising her affairs. Appellant does 
not refute his own admission that the diamond ring was be-
queathed to him by Halliefs codicil in satisfaction for 
whatever services he may have rendered. 
POINT I. 
THE GENERAL RULE OF QUANTUM MERUIT IS ADMITTED. HOW-
EVER, APPELLANT DOES NOT MEET THE QUALIFICATIONS OF 
THAT RULE, AS EVERY BENEFIT CONFERRED IS NOT RECOM-
PENSABLE, AND EVERY ENRICHMENT IS NOT UNJUST. 
For recovery in quantum meruit there must be a showing 
of facts of benefit accepted and unjustly conferred to imply 
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a contract. There are built-in qualifications to the gen-
eral rule of quantum meruit which spell out that; every 
benefit conferred is not recompensable and every enrich-
ment is not unjust. 
The qualifications to the general rule for recovery 
in quantum meruit and the parameters for the rules of implied 
contracts are: 
1. Voluntary services are not compensable. 
98 C.J.S 723. 
2. There must be reasonable expectation by both 
parties that compensation is to be paid. 
98 C.J.S. 724,735. 
3. A person who officiously confers a benefit on 
another is not entitled to restitution therefor. 
66 Am.Jur.2d §5,p.948. 
4. Gratuitous services are not compensable, parti-
cularly if the person rendering services 
changes his mind. 
17 A.L.R. 1371; 98 C.J.S.727; 8 A.L.R.2d 801. 
5. Moral obligation does not create an implied contract. 
17 AmJur.2d 477. 
6. A ,ffamily-type,f or social relationship, based on 
friendship and mutual concern, even where there 
is no relationship by blood or marriage, creates 
a presumption of rendering of services without pay. 
98 C.J.S. 741, 745; 7 A.L.R. 2d 12. 
The Utah Supreme Court has both recognized the general 
theory of quantum meruit and has in recent Utah cases limited 
restitution in quantum meruit for the reasons as above stated. 
Gleason v. Salt Lake City (1937) 74 P.2d 1225, 94 U.l, 
is the Utah decision uniformly referred to as the general 
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statement of the rule for recovery in quantum meruit. The 
court said: 
Ordinarily when services are rendered by one 
person for another, and voluntarily and know-
ingly accepted, without more, the law will 
imply a promise to pay what the services were 
reasonably worth. (Emphasis ours) 
In qualifying the general rule by adding "ordinarily" and 
"without more," the Utah court allowed the later Utah deci-
sions to spell out and deliniate situations which fail to 
imply in fact or in law a promise or fail to cause unjust 
enrichment. Quantum meruit requires a promise to pay im-
plied in fact. Facts negating such promise or causing an 
enrichment, not unjust, disallow recovery in quantum meruit, 
as there is then no implied contract in fact or in law. 
We accept as basic law the general rule for recovery 
in quantum meruit by implied contract, as set out in the 
Gleason case. All of the cases cited in Appellant's brief 
hold that there can be an implied promise to pay. We agree, 
but to find that implied promise all of the facts must be 
examined to determine the intention of both parties, as to 
whether pay was expected by the renderer and to be paid by 
the recipient of the services. What was the relationship 
of the parties? Was there a relationship of friendship on 
which the recipient should have been able to rely? What 
was the nature of the services? Were they such as both the 
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recipient and the renderer should reasonably expect to be 
for pay, or were they normal gratuities? 
The Utah Supreme Court in Burton v. McLaughlin (1950) 
217 P. 2d 566, 117 U.783, decided a quantum meruit case in-
volving personal services rendered to a decedent in his 
lifetime by a neighbor by quoting and applying this test 
from Williston on Contracts Rev. Ed. §36, p.94: 
It is a question of fact if services are accepted 
whether a reasonable man in the position of the 
parties would understand that they are offered 
in return for a fair compensation, or would rather 
suppose either that they are offered gratuitously, 
or if not, that the recipient might think so. 
Intimate friends sometime render services gratui-
tously and how close must relationship be to make 
one presumption or another applicable? The ques-
tion is purely one of fact, varying in every case, 
but with the burden always on the party, who 
alleges a contract and seeks to enforce it, to 
prove its existance. 
The Utah Court in the Burton case found that the exten-
sive nursing care rendered was not such as could possibly be 
/v 
expected from a neighbor as gratuity; that the rendered had 
provided food and medicine for the decedent; that the dece-
dent had admitted that she owed the renderer reimbursement; 
and that these facts could make for an implied contract. 
From the Kershaw deposition Judge Sawaya found abun-
dant facts to hold that Hallie Dennis looked upon Kershaw's 
acts as those of a volunteer and a friend and as gratuities; 
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that she did not expect to pay for them, except by way of 
the bequest of the ring; that Kershaw was a volunteer, and 
that he did not expect pay for the services rendered, which 
were the services normally expected of a friend; and that 
those facts negated any implied contract. 
POINT II. 
KERSHAW1S SERVICES WERE ACCEPTED BY HALLIE AS GRATUI-
TOUS, AND SHE DID NOT EXPECT TO PAY. KERSHAW DID NOT 
EXPECT TO BE PAID, BUT CHANGED HIS MIND AFTER HER 
DEATH. THESE FACTS DO NOT CREATE AN IMPLIED CONTRACT. 
The Utan court in McCollum v. Clothier (1952) 241 P.2d 
468, 121 U.311, cited at 98 C.J.S. 720, 724, 725 and 727, 
restated the general quantum meruit rule of the Gleason case 
and then added at page 470: 
It is appreciated that this rule should not be 
applied to bind one under implied contract who 
merely permits services to be rendered him, or 
accept benefits from another, under such cir-
cumstances that he may reasonably assume they 
are given gratuitously. The law should not re-
quire everyone to keep on guard against such 
possibilities by warning persons offering ser-
vices that no pay is to be expected. It is, 
therefore, essential that the court should 
exercise caution in imposing the obligations of 
implied contract, as contrasted to express con-
tract, where the parties have actually defined 
and agreed to the terms they are to be bound by. 
With such caution in mind, the test for the 
court to apply was: Under all the evidence, 
were the circumstances such that the plaintiff 
could reasonably assume he was to be paid and 
that the defendant should have reasonably ex-
pected to pay for such services. 
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Justice Wolfe wrote a concurring opinion in the 
McCollum decision, page 473, where he concurred in the lan-
guage in the main opinion, saying: 
My comment on this wise statement is that it 
appears to me that our courts have merely paid 
lip service to it or ignored it altogether. It 
is too easy in this state for one to surprisingly 
findhimself a promisor under an implied contract. 
All of us are familiar in life with instances 
where a seeming volunteer ingratiates himself into 
the confidence of another only to be later revealed 
as a self-seeker. 
The McCollum case is cited at 98 C.J.S. (Work & 
Labor) 720 under the statement: 
Implication of a contract to pay for services is 
greatly narrowed by rules of statutory and judi-
cial construction; the courts should exercise 
caution in imposing the obligations of an implied 
contract of this nature. 
The same admonition is at 17 C.J.S. (Contract) 556, 
again citing the McCollum case. 
In Jensen v. Anderson v. Radakovitch (1970) 468 P.2d 
366, 24 U.2d 191, the Utah court held that the fact that a 
holder of an option to purchase a decedent's property ob-
tained while visiting decedent and assisting him with various 
chores about decedent's property without any contemporaneous 
promise by decedent to pay for them was not consideration 
to support the option. The court found there was no evi-
dence to indicate that the services "were rendered at request 
as a matter of business" and consequently, no contemporaneous 
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promise in fact to pay for them. The court then restated 
the admonishment regarding implied promises by quoting 
the language from the McCollum decision set out above. 
The Jensen case is cited at 17 C.J.S. 839, §117, 
under the following statement: 
The authorities which speak of services ren-
dered on request as supporting a promise must 
be confined to cases where the request implies 
an undertaking to pay, and do not mean that, 
what was done as a mere favor can be turned 
into a consideration at a later time by the 
fact that it was asked for. 
The above language was quoted by C.J.S. from the 
Jensen opinion, page 368. 
Vogl v. Goldrick's Estate (1929) 224 NW.741, 198 Wis. 
500, is a case on all fours with Kershaw. Vogl, a bank 
president and long-time friend of Mr. Goldrick, performed 
some manual yard work, clerical services and gave business 
advice to Mrs. Goldrick, the widow living next door. Only 
after Mrs. Goldrickfs death, Vogl made a claim in quantum 
meruit for eight years services. The Wisconsin court denied 
the claim, saying that the relation existing between those 
parties would not raise an implied contract. The court 
added: 
Claimants, silent in the lifetime, become voluble 
when their pretended debtors can no longer speak. 
Such claims are not favored in the law. 
Let us examine the Kershaw deposition in the light of 
the McCollum and Jensen decisions for facts going to establish 
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or to negate an implied contract for payment of services. 
Kershaw stated that he acted on Halliefs requests and that 
her demands were "unreasonable" and that she was "unbearable." 
We repeat Kershaw1s statements: 
A. Well, I was with her every day, and she was 
a gal that—well, let's just put the cards on 
the table. She was the most demanding, cantan-
kerous bitch that God ever created, and she knew 
that her husband, Earl Dennis, had charged me" 
with the responsibility of taking "care of her 
before her death. And she went out of her way 
to make it miserable with her demands. She'd 
call four or five times a day and demand that I 
go do this, and that, and I'd tell her, 'hire 
a taxicab'. 'Well, they charge too much money.' 
(D.12) (Emphasis ours) 
A. What do you mean I looked on it, thought it 
was a job? It was a demand, a reqiiest to per-
form services for her. And she made it so 
unbearable that you couldn't do anything else 
but perform the service. (D.47) 
We submit that Kershaw's own statements prove that 
the requests and demands made by Hallie certainly did not 
contemplate that she would compensate him. On the contrary, 
it appears clearly that Hallie was expecting gratuitous 
services from Kershaw because of their long-standing friend-
ship and because of the known "charge" given to Kershaw by 
his "buddy" and brother Mason, Earl Dennis. 
Kershaw clearly stated in his deposition, pages 20, 
21, 22 and 23, that he had no agreement with Hallie, or any 
promise by her, for payment by her for his services in the 
past or in the future. Kershaw stated (D.47) that in his 
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personal income tax returns for 1972, 1973 and 1974 he did 
not take as deductions any automobile expenses, which he is 
now claiming. This clearly shows that during that period 
he was not looking at his acts as any work for which he was 
entitled to pay. His services were gratuitously rendered, 
and he did not expect pay at the times when rendered. 
Kershaw admitted that over the period of three years 
when he claimed to have rendered services for Hallie, at no 
time did he ask for reimbursement or make any demand for 
such. At page 23 of the Kershaw deposition is the following 
colloquy: 
Q. Did she ever agree to pay you $.12 a mile? 
A. No, she never discussed any mileage. 
Q. Did she ever agree to pay you anything for 
your expenses for operating your automobile? 
A. No, she didn't. She wasn't that type of a 
woman. She wasn't generous, let's put it 
that way. She was most demanding. 
Q. Did you ever make any demands on her for 
any of the x^ ork that you had done, including 
your mileage? 
A. No, I didn't make demands on her. 
Q. Was the first demand that you did make when 
you filed your claim after she died? 
A. Yes, I'll say indirectly, yes. 
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POINT III. 
KERSHAW WAS A VOLUNTEER. THERE WAS NO CONSIDER-
ATION FOR HIS SERVICES. A MORAL OBLIGATION IS 
NOT LEGAL CONSIDERATION. 
The Utah law is clear that a moral obligation does 
not make for legal consideration. 
In Manwill v, Oyler (1961) 361 P.2d 177, 11 U.2d 433, 
the plaintiff sued to recover payments voluntarily made by 
him on defandant1s land without any consideration or adequate 
promise for repayment. Plaintiff claimed that whereas defen-
dant had been materially benefited, defendant had a moral 
obligation to repay. The Utah court held that a moral obli-
gation by itself is not sufficient to make legal consider-
tion; that circumstances in addition to a purely moral obli-
gation "must be such that it is reasonably to be supposed 
that the promisee (plaintiff) expected to be compensated in 
some way therefor11; and the Utah court cited Section 78-12-
144 UCA, in requiring a writing signed by the party to be 
charged, as the statutory requirement to revive or establish 
a prior debt or claim. The Manwill case is cited at 17 Am. 
Jur.2d 487 in support of the general rule, "that a mere 
moral obligation, without anything more, is not a sufficient 
consideration for an executory promise." 
The general rule that a moral obligation based on 
relations of friendship and good will is not matter for legal 
redress is set out in Rask vs. Norman 169 N.W. 704, 141 Minn. 
198, 17 A.L.R. 1296. The Minnesota court would not allow 
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recovery on the promise of one business associate to 
another in his last illness to look after and protect 
the business interests of the latter*s wife, which was 
made on the basis of friendship and good will and was 
unsupported by pecuniary or material benefit. The gen-
eral rule is restated with many cases at the note of 
8 A.L.R.2d 787. See also 17 C.J.S. 776, §90. 
Kershaw was entirely a volunteer. He performed 
whatever services he did because of an obligation he felt 
toward his "buddy" and Masonic brother as shown in the 
following colloquy at page 13 of the deposition: 
Q. You said that Earl Dennis had charged 
you with the responsibility of taking 
care of Hallie, is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. How had he done that? 
A. Because he called me over on New Year's 
Day, January 1st, 1972, to tell me what 
bad shape he was in physically, and he 
had only a few days to live. And Hallie 
didn't realize it. And he had to have 
somebody to look after her until she died. 
We submit that Kershaw had no obligation, legal or moral, 
toward Hallie; that his services were rendered to her as a vol-
unteer and accepted reasonably by her as gratuitous; and that 
Kershaw at the time of rendering services, did not expect 
compensation. Kershaw twice dramatically denied any responsibility 
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for Hallie by saying: 
She was no responsibility of mine and they could 
drop her in a garbage can and send her to the 
city dump. (D.29,31) 
POINT IV 
KERSHAW ACTED OFFICIOUSLY IN IMPOSING HIMSELF ON 
HALLIE. THE LAW WILL ALLOW NO RECOVERY IN QUAN-
TUM MERUIT FOR SERVICES OFFICIOUSLY RENDERED. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Baugh v. Darby (1947) P.2d 
335, 112 U.l, cited at 98 C.J,S. 722, in a quantum meruit 
controversy held: "The mere fact that a person benefits 
another is not of itself sufficient to require the other 
to make restitution therefor,11 citing to A.L.I. Restatement 
of Restitution, Sec. 2, and further: nNor are services per-
formed by the plaintiff for his own advantage, and from which 
the defendant benefits incidentally, recoverable," citing to 
Restatement of Restitution, Sec. 40, comment C and Sec. 41 
(a)(1). 
A.L.I. Restatement of Restitution, Sec. 2, page 15, 
provides: "A person who officiously confers a benefit upon 
another is not entitled to restitution therefor.11 Comment 
(a) states: 
A. Officiousness means interference in the affairs 
of others not justified by the circumstances under 
which the interference takes place. Policy ordin-
arily requires that a person who has conferred a 
benefit whether by way of giving another services 
or by adding to the value of his land or by paying 
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his debt or even by transferring property to him 
should not be permitted to require the other to 
pay therefor, unless the one conferring the bene-
fit had a valid reason for so doing. A person is 
not required to deal with another unless he so 
desires and, ordinarily, a person should not be 
required to become an obligor unless he so desires. 
The principle stated in this section is not a limi-
tation of the general principle stated in Sec. 1; 
where a person has officiously conferred a benefit 
upon another, the other is enriched but is not con-
sidered to be unjustly enriched. The rule denying 
restitution to officious persons has the effect of 
penalizing those who thrust benefits upon others 
and protecting persons who have had benefits thrust 
upon them. 
The following comment is at 66 AmJur.2d 948: 
A basic principle underlying the rules in regard 
to restitution is that a person who officiously 
confers a benefit upon another is not entitled 
to restitution therefor. Where a person has 
officiously conferred a benefit upon another, the 
other is enriched but is not considered to be un-
justly enriched. 
In Wooldridge v. Wareing (1951), 236 P.2d 341, 120 
U.514, the Utah court in deciding another quantum meruit case, 
emphasized that services must be rendered unofficiously by 
one who reasonably assumes he will be compensated to recover. 
The qualification of unofficious performance appears four 
separate times in the Wooldridge opinion. 
Oxford Dictionary shows "meddlesome" as a synonym for 
"officious." Webster's Dictionary shows "impertinent" as a 
synonym, and "impertinent" is then defined as: "one who 
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meddles or intrudes in things which are not one's concern.11 
We submit that the Kershaw deposition by its whole tenor, 
and in the particulars hereafter shown, demonstrates that 
Kershaw imposed himself on Hallie without necessity and 
forced her to do his will. He was truly a meddler. 
In proof of his officiousness, we refer to Kershaw's 
proudful admissions of how he took Hallie Dennis out of 
the hospital, saying that this action was contrary to her 
doctors' orders (D.10,11). Kershaw claimed to have pre-
served Halliers estate by not allowing payment by Hallie of 
those doctors' legitimate claims for their medical services 
(D.44,45). Kershaw was shown Hallie's last check register 
(Exhibit 3, D.36) and checks issued (Exhibits 4 and 5, D.38, 
41,42) and he stated that some were in the handwriting of 
Hallie Dennis and some were in his printing. He said: "I 
asked her to sign everything. She did sign everything that 
I asked her to." (D.42) Kershaw said: "I'd explained to 
her what the charges were, and when she wanted to issue a 
check for something, that was ridiculous and she did, I 
wouldn't let her release the checks." (D.ll) 
In explaining what he meant by his claim for "preser-
vation of the estate," Kershaw said that he prevented Hallie 
from deeding her home to the Christian Science Church (D.8). 
He believed that Hallie was competent and never senile, and 
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when asked what he did to prevent Hallie from deeding the 
home to anyone, Kershaw answered: 
A. Just told her she couldnft sign anything, 
she couldn't give it. I told the Christian 
Science Church that she couldn't give that 
home to them. (D.8) 
Kershaw repeated that Hallie wanted to make a gift of 
her home to the Christian Science Church (D.43,44). He dis-
agreed with that church, and he stated that it was his 
objection that blocked her. At this point he stated he be-
lieved that Hallie was Msubject to being taken advantage of, 
namely, by the Christian Science Church.f! (D.44) 
Kershaw's officiousness culminated in the change of 
Halliefs will. Her will of January 27, 1972 gave to Kershaw 
an option to buy a certain diamond ring for $2,000.00 on 
Hallie!s death. He "ordered" Ralph Miller, Hallie!s attorney 
who had been employed at the suggestion of Kershaw in 1972 
(D.6), to prepare a codicil to Halliefs will (D.16,17). The 
codicil dated May 2, 1974 revoked the provision of the will 
giving Kershaw the option to buy the diamond ring, and it 
then bequeathed the ring to him outright (R.38). 
We are sure that Kershaw did have a miserable three 
years with Hallie Dennis, but as a volunteer, that was his 
problem. His services were not really necessary, Tracy-Collins 
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Bank was administering the trust of Earl Dennis, primarily 
for the benefit of Hallie (D.5,13,14). She had two grand-
children, neighbors, nurses and doctors who physically cared 
for her at her own expense (D.ll). Kershaw said that he 
Mcateredff to Hallie (D.44). The change in the will was 
proof positive of his officiousness and the ultimate success 
of his self-ingratiation. Justice Wolfe would have immed-
iately identified Walter Kershaw as the "seeming volunteer 
who ingratiates himself into the confidence of another only 
to be later revealed as a self-seeker." McCollum v. Clothier, 
supra. 
POINT V. 
A RELATIONSHIP BASED ON FRIENDSHIP AND MUTUAL CONCERN 
PRESUMES THAT SERVICES RENDERED WERE GRATUITOUS AND 
ACCEPTED AS SUCH. HALLIE BELIEVED THAT SHE WAS RECEIV-
ING GRATUITOUS HELP FROM HER HUSBAND'S BEST FRIEND. 
At 98 C.J.S. (Work & Labor) 741 is stated the general 
rule that the existance of a "family" relationship between 
the performer and the recipient of services raises a pre-
sumption of gratuity. Such presmuption rests on common ex-
perience. Blood or marriage relationship is not necessary 
to create the "family" relationship, which is really based 
on the mutual friendship and concern of the parties. 
The lengthy annotation at 7 A.L.R.2d 12 is summarized 
under the statement that: 
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The view is generally taken that the element of 
family relationship not only rebuts the general 
implication of a promise to pay for services 
rendered and accepted, but also raises an affir-
mative presumption which will preclude recovery 
for the services unless an agreement as to com-
pensation is established. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Mathias v. Tingey (1911) 
118 P.781, 39 U.561, held that services rendered by a child 
are presumed to be gratuitous unless an agreement can be 
shown to the contrary, thus settling in Utah the blood 
family situations. 
In Shields v. Eckman (1926) 248 P.122, 67 U.474, the 
Utah court showed that the gratuitous presumption should not 
apply in a parent-child case, where the child as provider 
gave up her own home to move in with the parent, and parti-
cularly where a promise to pay for the services was proved. 
Beyond blood and marriage ties, the social and frat-
ernal relations of the parties can raise a presumption that 
services are rendered without any intention or reasonable 
expectation of payment, as: 
Where in the case of neighbors, the social relations 
of the parties and the character of the services ren-
dered raise a presumption of gratuity, the law will 
not imply a contract for compensation. 98 C.J.S. 740, 
citing Vogl v. Goldrick's Estate, supra. 
Payne v. Bank of America (1954) 275 P.2d 128, 128 C.A. 
2d 295, was a quantum meruit suit by a business associate and 
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l?bosum friend" against the executor of his deceased friend 
for giving business advice, taking his friend for walks 
and drives, engaging doctors and nurses for him and gener-
ally caring for him. The California court denied recovery, 
saying at 275 P.2d 134: 
If at the time the services were originally ren-
dered they were intended to be gratuitous or as 
an accomodation, motivated by friendship, kind-
ness, or some other significant relationship 
existing between the parties, and were tendered 
without any expectation of remuneration, they 
cannot afterwards be converted into an obliga-
tion to pay their reasonable value under the 
theory of an implied contract. 
There was no blood, marriage or communal family rela-
tionship in the Payne case. It was the. fact of friendship 
which negated any implied promise to pay for the type of 
services rendered and accepted by the recipient and believed 
by him to have been friendly acts. 
The Payne case followed Smith v Riedele (1923) 213 
P.281, 157 Cal. 667, where recovery in quantum meruit for per-
sonal services was denied to a non-blood "family" member, 
where the recipient and the provider of services were close 
friends and fishing buddies. The California court would not 
imply any agreement to pay from acts of friendship, kindness 
and the close relationship between the parties, which made 
the provider and the recipient occupy positions similar to 
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that in a family. Other cases denying recovery for quantum 
meruit on a presumption of gratuitous nature of services 
are Morton v. Angst (1918) (Calif.) 173 P. 90, 36 C.A. 644 
(intimate friends); Dallman v. Frank (1905) (Calif.) 82 P. 5 
1 C.A. 541 (social friends and neighbors); Kremmel v. 
Schnaufer (1940) (Wash.) 103 P.2d 38, 4 Wash.2d 242 (banker 
friend); and Cook v. Bryson (1928) (Calif) 265 P. 289, 89 
C.A. 445 (business partners and close social friends). 
Let us examine the facts as shown in the Kershaw 
deposition in the light of and under the test of the Utah 
Burton v. McLaughlin decision, supra. 
Kershaw supervised Hallie Dennis f life because he 
felt that he had been "charged11 by his Masonic brother, 
Earl, to "look after" Earl's widow (D.13). He had no under-
standing with Hallie for any compensation, and he made no 
demand for pay during her lifetime (D.20-24). His services 
in driving her, running errands, helping in finding nurses 
and performing menial chores, were those normally expected 
of a friend. After her death, Kershaw complained of Hallie, 
saying that she was "unbearable," "a demanding, cantankerous 
bitch" and that his acts were not a friendly service. He 
did not expect pay from her. He said: "She wasn't that 
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type of woman. She wasn't generous." (D.23) However, he 
did accept Halliefs diamond ring after her death, follow-
ing the change in her will, as arranged by Kershaw (D.17-20). 
Kershaw admitted that Hallie knew that Earl Dennis 
had "charged" his Masonic brother to take careof Hallie (D.12). 
Hallie accepted the services of Kershaw as from a friend 
and a fellow member of the Presbyterian "church-family," 
believing that Kershaw was sincere in fulfilling his Masonic 
obligation to protect and care for the widow of a brother 
Mason. Kershaw's services may have been time-consuming and 
irritating to him, but they were really not necessary for 
Hallie. Tracy-Collins Bank, Earl's trustee, was ready al-
ways and did provide whatever necessary for her support and 
welfare. Kershaw's acts were those which should be expected 
of a long-time friend, and Hallie did accept them for what 
they were, namely, gratuities. 
Judge Sawaya examined the facts as stated in Kershaw's 
deposition, applied to them the test of the Burton v. McLaughlin 
case and concluded that, giving Kershaw the full benefit of 
the facts as stated, there was no way for him to recover 
under any theory of express or implied contract (R.44). 
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POINT VI. 
KERSHAW HAS ADMITTED RECEIPT BY HIM OF THE DIA-
MOND RING AS PAY FOR ANY SERVICES RENDERED. 
Paragraph Fifth of Hallie Dennis1 will gave to 
Kershaw a first option to buy her diamond ring for $2,000 
(R.31). Hallie instructed Kershaw and Ralph Miller, her 
attorney, to make the codicil dated May 2, 1974 (P.. 38) 
and thereby bequeath the ring to Kershaw (D17,18). The 
codicil is silent as to any reason for the bequest. In 
his probate claim, Kershaw has given credit against the 
claim of $6,600.00 for $2,000.00 for the ring as bequeathed 
to him (R.4). 
Appellant's brief does not refute tnat Kershaw admit-
ted the ring having been bequeathed to him in satisfaction 
for whatever services he may have rendered. He said: 
A. Well, I don't need to believe anything. 
It was her deal that she was grateful for 
the services I had performed up to that 
time and that the littlest she could do 
was to give me that ring. Now, she was 
giving it to me for services performed to 
that time. 
Q. And that was as of what date? 
A. The will, the codicil--she didnft tell me 
for what time. She told me for services 
rendered. There's no cutoff on the date. 
The codicil, where she gives me the ring, is 
May 2, 1974. (D.19) 
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We submit that Kershaw has been paid more than 
amply through his own manipulations. 
The California court in Payne v Bank of America, 
supra, said at 275 P.2d 136: 
A person who expects to be benefited by a 
legacy cannot later resort to an action for 
the reasonable value of his services where 
a mere expectation is shown and neither an 
express nor an implied contract to pay for 
the services is established. 
I\Fe submit that Kershaw should not be allowed to take 
a bequest from Hallie Dennis, then turn around and collect 
further from the estate of this decedent, whom he termed 
an "ungrateful bitch." 
CONCLUSION 
The deposition of Walter Kershaw conclusively confirms 
that there was no promise by Hallie Dennis in fact or implied 
in fact or law to pay for any services by Kershaw. He was 
a volunteer, and more, he was an officious meddler. Services 
accepted by Hallie were believed by her to have been gratui-
tous because of her past friendship and that of her husband 
with Kershaw. He did not expect to be paid, beyond the be-
quest of the diamond ring, until he changed his mind after 
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Halliefs death. There is no basis for any implied contract 
in quantum meruit. The Utah case law is entirely opposed 
to any recovery for Kershaw. Judge Sawaya1s decision 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JAMES W. BELESS 
1011 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
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